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1. Outline 
If we start from a conventional conception of litera-
ture in a broad sense, then we can regard as "poetry" or 
"literary works" all those oral or written utterances which 
are so declared by the authors or so admitted by the recip-
ients. A variaty of outward forms in characteristic of these 
historic occurences. Spells and magic tales, as well as the 
works of "concrete poetry" can be included here. 
The following considerations, however, will refer only 
to a more restricted part of the varied and multi-functional 
poetry thus conceived. More precisely, to the literary works 
in connection with which the following questions are put-: do 
they have any part in cognition, and if so, what may we come 
to know through them? It is enough to think of the culture 
of our continent, and we can see that the range of such 
works extends from Homer's epics to Beckett's dramas and 
further still. So it seems reasonable to ask that one of the 
central concerns of literary theory should be to answer 
these questions. In our opinion, every literary theory must 
be able to tell what the cognitive function is and what kind 
of knowledge may be attained through the analysis of liter-
ary works, or certain classes of these, forming the subject 
of literary research determined by the theory in question. 
This set of questions has been present in European 
thinking for a long time. It already appears in mythological 
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forms of this thought in debated as to whether Hermes or 
Apollon should be the patron of poetry, in the relation be-
tween philosophy and poetry, Plato and Aristotle are the 
first to raise the questions with which we are concerned. 
But our purpose here is not to present a historical survey. 
We refer rather only to the essential methodological lessons 
drawn from such a survey: scientifically established results 
can only be achieved, if questions which seem particularly 
poetic are analysed in an overall theoretical framework. It 
will hardly be sufficient to define the relation between 
"poetry and reality" ("Dichtung und Wahrheit") by means of 
poetics only or of the. conceptual system of aesthetics in 
some strict sense. Since the relationship in question can be 
seen as one special instance of the possible relationship 
between sign and significatum, it is expedient that we should 
take into consideration all those results attained in this 
field by linguistics, semiotics, logic and epistemology. 
Naturally, if the literary theoretician wants to exploit thé 
results of the above mentioned disciplines, he is forced, 
then, to express his demands - in our case for a semantic 
theory satisfactory to literary theory - clearly and defi-
nitely. The profit, however, is not necessarily unilateral 
and unidirectional, since demands concerning the producti-
vity of a semantic theory can at the same time mean a desir-
able challange for scholars of the sciences mentioned above. 
A consistent and complete semantic theory, able to describe 
and explain from its own point of view, the mechanism of 
natural and artificial languages in all possible context of 
use, would no doubt come in useful to every scholar. In our 
opinion, this task cannot be solved by a considerable exten-
sion of the subject matter of any of the foregoing disci-
plines. Rather there is a need for interdisciplinary co-op-
eration on the basis of common cognitive interest concerning 
semiotic systems. All the mentioned sciences examine the 
problem of how semiotic systems can deliver truths and how 
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they can orient the action of their users. 
2. The Frege paradigm 
From this last point of view, logic can be considered 
the fundamental discipline. Since logic, according to the 
founder of its modern, symbolical version, Gottlog Frege, 
is a science dealing with the most general laws of truth 
("Wahrsein"). But if we study Frege1s semantic theory from 
the viewpoint of literary theory, we must conclude that his. 
thesis is not satisfactory for establishing the semantics 
of literary texts. While sketching our objections, we wish 
to illustrate with a concrete example: what demands does a 
literary theory raise for semantic theories? In the spirit " 
of the foregoing, we shall show both the specific criteria 
on the basis of which literary theory may object to a se-
mantic theory, and the advantages following the co-operation 
between the various branches of science. Undoubtedly, liter-
ary theory may become richer through' the study and acquisi- , 
tion of versions of the logical semantics. In addition, a 
critical study with an eye to the demands of literary theory 
can lead to questions stimulating the improvement of the 
given theory of logical semantics. 
The insufficiency of Frege's semantics demonstrable 
from the viewpoint of literary theory - in contrast with 
many other logical semantics - does not derive from the fact 
that the scholar of logic ignored these aspects of the ques-
tion. Frege sees rather clearly that language has different 
usages. He differentiates the diverse usages by the lan-
guage's ability, in the case of a given usage, to convey 
truth. According to this, there exists serious and non-se-
rious speech, and the question of truth can only be raised 
in connection with the former. Only the statements of seri-
ous speech express thoughts, and thus only the thoughts can 
be true or false. In the case of non-serious speech we state 
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something only apparently, so such sentences express only 
apparent thoughts. But these are not included "in the con-
cern of logic, as the physicist willing to examine storm, 
ignores the storm on stage." (Frege 1973 (1897): 44) As our 
example shows, in Frege's system the serious speech includes 
the utterances of science, while the non-serious speech in-
cludes the utterances of science, while the non-serious 
speech includes those of poetry. 
As is well-known, in Frege's semantic theory both true 
and false are objects, and the objects as references ("Be-
deutungen") are denoted by proper names. Expressions not 
taking this role, are merely quasi-proper names ("Schein-
eigenname"). The quasi-proper names and the class of proper 
names still have a common feature: images are linked to the 
expressions belonging to them. Yet the images are always of 
a subjective nature because in every case they are some-
one's images, and because two people can never possess the 
same image. According to Frege, the duty of poetry is to 
produce precisely especially strong images. Beauty is the 
characteristic of images and the quasi-proper names pre-
cisely evoke particularly coloured images. Eventually, 
Frege's ideas on the difference of literature and science 
can be concluded as follows: science strives for the true, 
whereas poetry strives for th beautiful and only the beau-
tiful. The true is objective and, as a consequence of this, 
is the common property of many people. The beautiful is sub-
jective, thus it can be the content of only one mind. So it 
is impossible to imagine for Frege a discipline, the object 
of which is the literary work: "Every enjoyer of art has his 
own work of art, so between judgements referring to beauty 
there can be contradiction by no means" (Frege 1973 (1897): 
47). If we were still to insist on the scientific study of 
poetry, we could then do it only in the domain of psycholoqv. 
The possible confusion of serious and non-serious 
speech reveals that the expressions - at least in some cases 
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- do riot bear the sign of being proper names or just quasi-
proper names. That speech is serious or non-serious must be 
decided seperately. If we wish to work out a suitable pro-
cedure of decision within the scope of Frege's conceptual 
system, then we come up against the following insurmount-
able difficulty: Frege deduces the concepts of semantic 
theory from the definition of the object. The reference 
("Bedeutung") is the object, sense ("Sinn") is the way the 
object is given to us. An expression denoting object is 
considered a proper name. For Frege, however, - as is well-
known - not only those things are objects which can be rec-
ognized in the physical world with our organs of sense, but 
also the numbers - like number "7" -»geometrical forms -
like the "triangle" and, moreover, truth-values themselves. 
So the following question is inevitable: Why does "7" 
denote an object in mathematics, and why does "William Tell" 
not denote an object in Schiller's William Tell? Further-
more, why is the expression "3 + 4 = 7" true, and why is the 
expression "Tell shot an apple from his son's head" not 
true? Nor can the latter expression be false for Frege, 
since it is from a literary work. 
The logicians adhering to the conception of Frege will 
not find it strange, of course, that objects cannot be ren-
dered into statements of literary works. So they can answer 
our questions thus: That there existed a William Tell, and 
whether he shot an apple from his son's head or not, must be 
determined by the same methods as the questions: did Alex-
ander the Great ever exist and did he have a horse called 
Bucephalus? By no means do we proceed in the same way when 
deciding that the expression "3 + 4 = 7" is true. 
However, this answer cannot be satisfying for the school 
scholars of literary theory. Since, if we want to clarify 
the William Tell problem using the methods of the historian, 
then we are historians and not literary theorists. 
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Our reilectlon can also support an argument for lit-
erature being unable to constitute the subject of a special 
Literary science differing from history. And if our re-
searches result in the tact thai: William TeJ.! does not re-
ally exist, or, in reference to Frege, we postulate it in 
advance, then evidently we do not have the opportunity of 
admitting or negating some characteristics of William Tell. 
If the science of literature with its own congitive interest 
and method, cannot be studied, then we also must have a neg-
ative answer to the question as to whether literary texts as 
literature have any role in cognition. The inevitably neg-
ative answer, however, contradicts our intuition. There ex-
ists a literary science institutionally studied, and its 
history shows that its cognitive Interest and methodology at 
least partly differs from those of the history. Already 
Aristotle tried to work out such a literary theory in which 
"poetry tells the universal while history the individual 
cases" (Cf. Poetics, Ch. 9). 
3. The problem of the r&f.-. rtrna* of 11 l.-nwy characters^ 
We would like to demonstrate our observations concern-
ing the reference of literary characters with the help of 
an analogy. The subject matter of the analogy - adhering to 
a former example of ours - is constituted by natural num-
bers . 
In our opinion the natural numbers, concepts of second 
order also in Frege"s system, express something general. The 
general in this context means that connections or systems of 
connections expressed by natural numbers may be valid not 
only on one subject but on a whole range of subjects. On the 
other hand, the truth of statements coming from operations 
with natural numbers depends on whether we keep the rules on 
the basis of which the operations are performable, and which 
secure that the reference of expressions does not change 
- 121 -
without marking that change. If a "sentence" resulting from 
an operation with natural numbers, e.g.: "3 + 4 = 7" is 
true - and it is true according to Frege because the ex-
pressions on both sides of an equation denote the same ob-
ject then the connection expressed by the "sentence" is 
generally true. That is, it can be valid in different sub-
ject matters. We want to stress two elements of the forego-
ing considerations. On the one hand, the "existence" of nat-
ural numbers depends on whether they are the members of a 
well-formed system. On the other hand, the generality of 
natural numbers and the expressions resulting from opera-
tions with them depends on whether or not their validity 
range is confined to one subject matter. We can also note 
that the number theories constitute those systems of rules 
which determine the inner structures of various numerical 
systems and the operations that can be performed with their 
members. The task of the single branches of applied mathe-
matics, then, is to elaborate the possible ways of refer-
ence of the different numerical systems to one another or 
to spheres beyond numerical systems. In other words, to 
determine the exploration of the less abstract images or 
models of the more abstract connections indicated above. So 
we must take into account that the systems of rules are of 
a formal nature and are always given by the theory, that is, 
they are human constructions. 
In one respect, there is a similar situation with lit-
erary characters. Their existence also depends on the ex-
istence of a system. This system which, for instance, ap-
pears as the structure of events in a work describing e-
vents, is given neither in advance nor explicitly but must 
be discovered by the scholar of "applied literary theory", 
the analyst of the work in question. He must reveal that 
the composition of events follows that of a more abstract 
sequence of events. This more abstract sequence of events 
is one realization of possible formations according to a 
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system of rules, that is, a well-formed sequence of events. 
Let us call this abstract, well-formed sequence of events 
action from here on, or in other words action-structure. 
Consequently, we attribute existence conditionally to the 
characters of literary works describing a sequence of events 
only until we can explore or establish the systems of rules, 
according to which the action-model defining the composition 
of the sequence of events in the given literary work can be 
constructed. The more abstract equivalents of characters in 
the sequence of events in a work will be called figures in 
the action-structure. The attributes (=properties and rela-
tions) of figures are consequently prescribed by the system 
of rules. So the characters of the classes of literary works 
in question can be considered existent inasmuch as they cor-
respond to a figure, and they are general because it is not 
necessary that one figure should have only one corresponding 
character. All those structured sets of states of affairs 
can be mapped onto the action containing the figures, and 
which can be generated with the help of the system of rules 
underlying the model. At the same time, if we cannot 
strengthen our previous hypothesis that sequences of events 
of a particular text-world imitate a well-formed action-
model in their composition, while its characters imitate 
that of their attributes, then we are forced to regard the 
sequences of events as disordered and the characters as non-
existent . 
What emerges from these in relation to the cognitive 
role and subject of literary works? We think that if the 
science of literature wishes to attribute a role in cogni-
tion to the class of literary works taken here as an exam-
ple, then it must elaborate or find those systems of rules 
which determine the action-model of the single works or a 
whole series of them. If the analyst's work has succeeded, 
he can then try to expand the composition of the sequence 
of events, and the range of validity pertaining to the 
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features and systems of relations of the characters' at-
tributes: while he takes the role of the historian, the 
sociologist or the moral-philosopher, the analyst can judge 
where and when similar systems of rules operated in the 
world not necessarily available through texts, that is, in 
the real world. Besides, he can set requirements for the 
agents of the real world, for men of action, and he can set 
tasks and aims to be accomplished according to the explored 
system of rules. 
This latter observation, however, indicates the limits 
of the analogy that is set up. No doubt, there is a simila-
rity between the numbers and characters, the numerical sys-
tems and the action-structures from the analysed point of 
view, nevertheless we have to admit that the role of liter-
ary works played in cognition cannot be deduced solely with 
an analogy available in the subject of mathematics and lit-
erary science. The orderodness of text-worlds is not only 
of a syntactic-semantic nature, but of a pragmatic nature 
as well. In literary works the syntactic-semantic component 
always bears ethical values. Eventually that is the way lit-
erary works could and can become action-orienting systems. 
In this context can we speak of the cognitive role of lit-
erature, and can clarify more closely the question of what 
the knowledge, delivered by the given literary work, means. 
4. 'Major concepts of "possible world" in logic 
The next task is to find a semantic theory suitable 
for our purposes: a theory with the help of which the seman-
tic aspects of the foregoing considerations can be described 
systematically. In dealing with literary characters, we have 
already introduced some concepts the usefulness of which be-
comes apparent now. The expressions "real world", "possible 
range of reference", almost suggest that for the clarifica-
tion of the above problems, it is advisable to rely on the 
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possible-worlds semantics. This semantics has been elaborat-
ed by various modal and philosophical logics in the course 
of time, but above all in the last two decades. Using the 
possible-worlds semantics in literary theory is a tempting 
•experiment for the very reason because it would mean the 
revival of an old thought under new conditions, when the de-
vices of logic and the literary theory have been refined 
considerably since the first explicit experiment. The old 
thought referred to is the theory of Bodmer and Breitinger 
who tried to apply the Leibnizian concept of possible worlds 
directly to literature3. 
Studying the recent logical literature dealing with 
this question in mind, we find that the concept of possible 
world occurs in very different systems, and that these sys-
4 
terns define its content rather loosely and diversely . Es-
sentially, however, two basic types of opinions can be iso-
lated. 
(,l.a) According to one kind of thinking, possible worlds 
are that kind of abstract models of set theory which rep-
resent definite states. These theories are characterized 
mainly by the fact that, when giving the truth-conditions 
of propositions they fix formal and not material conditions^. 
(,l,.b) The constructivistic concept does not regard the pos-
sible worlds as given, but establishes them from the propo-
sitions in the light of certain conditions. That is, this 
kind of theory does not simply assume, but gradually builds 
up, that is, materially defines the possible worlds. 
If asking what standpoints the theories represent con-
cerning the relationship between the real world and possible 
worlds, then again the opinions form two major groups. 
(_2.aX Some logicians and philosophers think that possible 
worlds are autonomious evtities, and can be reduced to no-
thing else. According to them, these worlds must be under-
stood in the same way as our own world, that is)vthe differ-
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ence between the possible worlds and the real world cannot 
be ascribed to type-difference. The only point is that the 
events happening in the real world are different from those 
taking place in the various possible worlds. 
(,2.b) Several philosophers, however, state that possible 
worlds are theoretical constructs, intellectual projections 
the basis of which is the actual world. So possible worlds, 
through some vehicles, can be deduced from the real world. 
The construction of possibilities, in accordance with this, 
can happen by means of transformations of different com-
plexity. The transformations operate on the population of 
individuals, the descriptive make-ups and on the really 
7 operative laws of nature . 
5. The concept of possible world in literary theory 
In the first approach it seems that out of the dif-
ferent logical concepts (l.b) and (,2.b) promise the most 
for literary theory. That is to say, those logical ideas 
which expound the content of the concept of possible world. 
When, in principle, we also believe that possible worlds' 
are functions of the real world, we want to further stress, 
however, that this close dependence only occurs in the 
course of construction, or it is relevant only in that pro-
cess, since if the establishment of the possible world is 
finished, we can blow up the bridge over which we crossed 
from the real world to the given possible world. Let us 
imagine, for example, that we want to look for all those 
possible worlds which can be constructed with respect to a 
given possible wor]d. In this case we need not return to 
that real world from which the possible world in question 
was deduced. It is enough to regard the already-constructed 
possible world hypothetically as a real world from which g 
further possible worlds can be derived . The above proce-
dure guarantees that concepts of possible worlds shown in 
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(l.a) and (2.a) can also be used in cases of reconstruction 
of possible worlds. The great necessity of this opportunity 
for the interpretation of literary works will be easier to 
see, if we define the concept of possible world in literary 
theory more closely. 
First, however, we want to clear up the connections 
between the text-worlds, possible worlds and the real world. 
The practice of interpretations of literary works dis-
closes that the reconstruction of text-worlds of literary 
texts and the explanation of their structure is not possible 
on the basis of only one actual state of- the real world. 
Even if it were possible, that explanation would be irrele-
vant from the specific cognitive point of view of literary 
science. This, in the first place, is related partly to the. 
reference and truth problem already dealt with. Since no 
one can seriously doubt the fact that a lot of literary 
characters cannot by any means be referred directly to flesh-
and-blood persons of the real world, or at least not in a 
relevant way. It is conceivable in principle that none of 
the states of affairs in a literary text-world has an equiv-
alent in the real world, and therefore all the statements 
which express and denote the state of affairs of a text-
world are false. Moreover we can postualte, as many have, 
that every statement, which occurs in a literary work, inde-
pendent of the fact whether the state of affairs drawn by 
the"statement has an equivalent in the real world or not, is 
necessarily false. We can represent that opinion, too -
Frege's studies are good examples for this - that literary 
works do not contain statements in advance, so the question 
of truth-value cannot even be raised. No matter how we think 
of the sentences of the literary texts, we never regret ac-
knowledging that the characters and the states of affairs 
described by these sentences, play or can play a construc-
tive role in establishing a specifically autonomous world 
that will be defined more clearly in the following. 
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Discussing the analogy of numbers and literary charac-
ters, we have already referred to the fact that the charac-
ters of literary works, if they are to be considered exist-
ent, can be referred to the figures of a more abstract ac-
tion-model. We noted though, that, on the one hand, the 
number of characters and figures is not necessarily the 
same, while on the other hand, that the action-model itself 
is an abstraction, so its extension is smaller than that of 
the concrete text-worlds. But the analyst of the work must 
give the reference of all characters, that is, the slgnifi-
catum of every sign in principle. Furthermore, he must de-
cide on the truth-value of all states of affairs in the 
text-world. As a consequence of this, in spite of the oblig-
atory correspondence-relations, there is no such action-
model possible which forms the entire reference range of a 
given text-world. We also noted that all those structured 
sets of states of affairs can serve as a possible reference 
range for a text-world, the structure of which can be map-
ped to the action-model containing the figures and abstract 
events. The sets of states of affairs fulfilling the above 
conditions may be regarded as the possible worlds of liter-
rary works, and we suppose that characters in the text-
worlds refer to the individuals of possible worlds. The 
true and false truth-values can be rendered to the sentences 
expressing and denoting the states of affairs also according 
to the connection between the single states of affairs of 
the text-world and the possible world. Though it can hardly 
be doubted after the above, we still stress the following: 
the possible worlds as the referential ranges of the text-
worlds are not metaphysical entities. Possible worlds are 
essentially the referential ranges of the text-worlds struc-
tured, or to put it in another way, explicated with the help 
of the action-models. They are constructs in which the ar-
bitrariness of the states of affairs and their connections 
composing the text-world ceases. We can say figuratively 
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that possible worlds are the "images' of action-models con-
structed on the basis of the systems of rules, inasmuch as 
we approach the analysed class of literary texts from the 
recipient. The metaphoric expression relates to the fact 
that the abstract actions can be realized in very different 
'surface structures'. It is said in this connection that the 
extension of the possible world of a text can be conside-
rably greater than that of its text-world. This information-
enrichment, not irrelevant from the easthetic point of view, 
is related to the role of the action-model: the action-model 
as an abstract structure, and, consequently, a structure of 
more general force can 'open' several (similarly structured) 
referential ranges for the text—world in question, which the 
text-world as such can never achieve. It is time to draw 
the conclusion already evident by now: text-worlds, possi-
ble worlds and action-models are situated on different lev-
els of abstraction, therefore the methods for approaching 
and reconstructing them are also different. The text-worlds 
are mainly available through text-linguistical operations, 
.the action-models through logical-epistemological and the 
possible worlds through text-linguistical and logical- " 
epistomological. Thus is the cognitive function and value 
of literary texts related to the hypothesis of possible 
worlds, -on the one hand, while, on the other, it is related 
to the comparison of structures of the possible worlds and 
the.real world, A question to be dealt with later in more 
detail. 
As we have seen, the action-model plays a distinguished 
part in relation to the possible worlds. Among other things, 
it is so because the existence of literary works as possible 
worlds is attached to these models, and is determined by the 
models and by the rules generating those models, respective-
ly. This fact definitely excludes the possibility of meta-
physical interpretations of the possible-world concept used 
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here. When we stated that the literary characters refer 
partly to the figures of the action-models, partly to the 
individuals of a possible world, we then tried to give an 
explanation to the following facts. At least one part of the 
characters, determined by the model, possesses characteris-
tics of general force, that is, shares the 'number'-nature 
of figures. At the same time, all characters in the works, 
also those being directly attached to figures, preserve 
their individual nature, accidental-contingent characteris-
tic , and in this way they contribute to the creation of the 
'specialness' of the possible worlds. They cannot lose their 
contingent features for the action-models wish and are able 
to explain the text-world as a possible world only in a cer-
tain respect and do not explore all possible structures in 
it. 
The foregoing passages proved that the reference of 
figures, and generally the truth-value of the statements of 
a text is' closely related to our interpretational and prag-
matic standpoint. It is related to the way we read a text 
and to what kind of text we consider it to be from the be-
ginning. We tried to argue in the above that we handle lit-
erary texts as vehicles of possible worlds. In our consid-
eration, concepts like text-world, possible world, action-
model, real world, etc. are linked in one consistent con-
ceptual system. • 
• In a given possible world, which can be mapped to a 
literary text, truths and demandable norms derived from the 
base action-model and system of rules, also valid in the 
real world, 'reveal themselves' in a specific way by method-
ically reforming the real world. 
The literary characters as possible individuals, the 
extension of the reference-range of the text-world, and thus 
the growth, of information-richness of the possible world, 
the possible world as the 'showing up' of action-models in 
the sphere of the 'specific', that is, the realization of 
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abstract structures through specific surface structures, 
and other similar connections demonstrate convincingly that 
the introduced conceptual system can connect and explain the 
cognitive function of literary works, the knowledge deli-
vered by them and the aesthetic quality of that knowledge in 
a consistent and natural way. 
Before finishing this phase of our discussion, we re-
turn briefly to the question, how the concept of 'possible 
world' in literary theory, drawn before, relates to the 
'possible world' concepts in logic. 
We have already referred to the following: to (re)con-
struct the structure serving as the basis of a possible 
world, we must start from the supposition that the text-
world to be analyzed is a possible world. That is, in the 
first approach, like the formal conceptions of (l.a) and 
(.2.a), we postulate it as a possible world. To strengthen 
this hypothesis, we can try then to define those rules which 
materially determine and explain the possible world formally 
postulated in the sense of (l.b) and (2.b). The strong ne-
cessity of such a connection derives from the following con-
sideration: the reader of literary texts cannot suppose that 
there is a world available, independent from the world of 
the read text, with the help of which he could determine the 
truth-value of the statements in the text, and through which 
he could explain the composition of the text-world with the 
'mapping' operation. He can attempt, however, - and in so 
doing he does the job of a literary theorist - the systematic 
construction of a model which seems to be relevant from the 
point of view of the text-world's composition: its construct-
ing rules prevail in the text-world, they make it true and 
understandable from the viewpoint in question, that is, to 
change it to a possible world. 
The realization of our objective raises the following 
methodological problem: if we do not want to make in advance 
the laws and norms prevailing in the given state of real 
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world the system of rules in the model to be set up - for, 
in doing so, every possible world would be an image of a 
given state of real world - then we have to elaborate the 
procedure for disclosing the systems of rules underlying 
the various possible worlds. 
6. A theoretical example for the literary explanation of 
text-worlds operating with possible worlds 
First we would like to explain more precisely the prin-
ciple of possible world in the sense of (l.a). 
To understand a modal notion is to understand a certain 
relation. This is the <alternativeness relation", which is 
defined on a given set of possible worlds. According to Hin-
tikka, the alternatives to a world W may be thought of as 
those possible worlds which could be realised instead of H. 
In connection with this, a proposition p is possibly true 
in W, if and only if p is true in at least one alterna-
tive possible world of W. That p be necessarily true in 
W requires the condition that p should be true in every 
alternative possible world of W. 
Let us take now the finite set of the propositions p, 
q, r... z the extension of which is the sequence of events 
of text-world Wfc. In the following we consider this sequence 
of events as identical with In our assumption is 
the distinguished possible world W* of the real world Wr. 
"Distinguished" in this context means that W* is exactly 
that possible world from among the alternatives of W r in 
which p, q, r,..z are true. In Hintikka's semantic theory 
this ensures the possible truth of p, q, r,..z in Wr. We 
must mention two more preconditions of the text-world inter-
pretation: 
(i) P» q, r ... z neither belong only nor in the first 
place to the worlds of characters of W ; 
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tiil W r is not directly relevant from the viewpoint of 
text-world interpretation. 
The text-world W , which as opposed to the possible + 
world W , can be characterised as the choice and construc-
tion of the sequence of events p, q, r ... z, is not jus-
tified. At the same time W+, unlike Wt, is not given in a 
way available simply by linguistic devices, and we can re-
gard it as existent only if conditions ensuring the truth 
of p, q, r ... z are given. The elaboration of a system 
M for fulfilling the truth-conditions of p, q, r z, 
however, will not mean any more that we postulate the pro-
positions truej but that we have made them true by means of 
M. The system M in question, identical with the action-
model in this case, gives the material explanatory princi-
ple of W demanded by Rescher, and thus, in fact, the 
composition of W . 
But we have not yet reached the end of our investiga-
tions. We can take a step further with the method of modal 
semantics, Inasmuch as we now regard the possible world W + 
as a hypothetically real world. So in the next phase we 
search for alternative possible worlds for W +, and try to 
find at least one in which Mtp, q, r ... z) propositions 
of W + are true. That is, now we do not seek the truth of 
the single propositions, but rather a possible world in 
which the structure of propositions determined by M is 
true. Suppose that we should find such a world and 
W + + coincides with a clearly limited fraction of W . Since 
the mapping refers to the structure in question, W ful-
fills the truth-conditions also, if the propositions 
p, q, r ... z are replaced by other propositions or real 
sets of affairs. Our sole requirement is that the new pro-
positions, or real sets of affairs should have a structure 
M', either isomorphic or homomorphic with respect to M, 
The problem that the structure M itself can be multi-
dimensional in the case of literary narratives will not be 
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dealt with here. It is more important to observe that our 
method based on possible worlds comes full circle: in the 
example, starting from the real world W through the 
^ + 
text-worlds Wfc and the possible worlds W we reached 
•the real world W again. More precisely: the range of W ' +4-
coinciding with the possible worlds W structured by M'. 
We stress, however, that our process, in spite of all ap-
pearances, is not tautologic, for there is a hierarchical 
difference between the start and the end of the route vir-
tually made. From an epistemological point of view, the Wr, 
chosen for the start, is evidently not the W of the end. 
We wanted to make the .difference in the abstractional de-
gree of levels clear with the introduction of the marking W + T. Out of the grades connecting the starting point W ++ ^ 
and the end W , the text-world W. is realized on the t + 
level of comprehension, while the possible worlds W on 
that of explanation. From the viewpoint of cognition, W + 
can be attributed the following value: W + represents pos-
sible truths, inasmuch as in the real world W W pos-
* + + r sessed an alternative W in the treated sense. But if in 
W or in W' , that is, in the real world and other text-r t' ' 
worlds, respectively, there are more alternative worlds 
(.e.g.: W + + +, W + + + + etc.) of W+, then the general validity 
force of truths represented by W + actually increases 
parallel to their cognitive value. With regard to the fact -
that the scientific research making this circle is of an 
empirical nature, there is no way to establish logically 
necessary truths. 
In the end, we must make another mention in connection 
with the 'choice' of propositions structured by M. We can-
not declare that the real world W r always possesses such 
fractions that are characterized by M*-structures, that is, 
which qualify the possible world W + as a possibly true 
world on the basis of the correspondance principle. ,There 
are, or at least can be imagined, such literary world whose 
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possible worlds do not have alternatives in the real world. 
The alternatives of the possible worlds of a certain work 
of art must be sought in many cases in the various modali-
ties of W r. Literary works try to influence and orient 
their readers, and with the help of their possible world W + 
they 'show* what the real world W f should look like, must 
have looked like, could have looked like, etc.. It is evi-
dent that the possible truths become relativized in such 
cases. It is a more extreme example when the possible world 
of a literary work can be reconstructed, but no alternatives 
can be found for the model either in the real world or among 
its modalities. Until it can no longer be decided whether or 
not it is the invention of new truths not yet seen, it is 
more suitable to act in accordance with the coherence prin-
ciple of truth. If the statements in question can be deduced 
relying on the constructed model without contradiction, then 
we consider them valid statements. And valid statements in 
this system are true statements. Naturally as far as the ac-
tion-model has no alternatives on the basis of the corre-
spondence principle, we can speak of non-actualized possible 
truths". 
7. . Concluding remarks 
If we assert the epistemological question raised in the 
beginning of the study, then we also must declare that the 
cognitive function of poetry must be registered among the 
essential functions that can be performed by literary works. 
But the acceptance of such a standpoint has far-reaching 
consequences for literary theory: we must require, for ex-
ample, that such a semantic theory should form a part of 
literary theory with the help of which into the statements 
of literary, texts truth-values can be rendered. In this con-
nection, the first problem is that exactly that semantic 
"school which elaborated the semantics operating with truth-
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values, denies in advance the mapping of truth-values to 
the statements in-literary texts. To be more precise, it 
does not even allow that the thoughts expressed by assertive 
sentences can be regarded as statements. Thus, in fact, it 
denies that literary works can have any part in cognition, 
that is - apart from psychologocal knowledge - we can learn 
nothing through them. The above negative answer is derived 
from the conception that exclusively the real world can be 
regarded as the referential range of literary text-worlds, 
and so the basis of truth-value mapping as well. In this 
study we have argued that the truth-value of statements of 
literary texts can-be decided with the construction of dif-
ferent possible referential ranges. To form our conception 
into a theory, the possible-worlds semantics can offer a 
suitable basis and frame. We have reached this conviction 
but by starting to study the different modal logic systems 
or philosophical logic but on the basis of practical exper-
iments in text-world interpretation. Thus the presented lit-
erary theory conception is independent of the semantic model 
that serves as the interpretent of the metatheory of text-
world interpretation. Though we took the stand that the 
truth-value of statements in literary texts cannot be deter-
mined by direct reference to the real world, we by no means 
want to deny, that the possibility of this procedure exists, 
and acknowledge that the realization of this possibility is 
necessary in certain methods of literary text analyses. 
Therefore, literary theory cannot ignore this circular of 
question. We stress, however, that resulting from the nature 
of literary work, the indirect connection between text-world 
and real world, the systematic establishment of which is a 
scientific task, is more important. This is the reason for 
the more detailed treatment of the possibilities of the in-
direct, systematic connection in this study. To enlighten 
the problems, we introduced the concept of text-world, pos-
sible world, real world and action-model. As a suggestion 
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for solving.the question, we formed the following rela-
tionships between them: the text-world represented by lin-
guistic devices can be declared a possible world with the 
help of an explanatory action-model constructed on the basis 
of a system of rules. The possible worlds as structured and 
so explained text-worlds can be compared through the action-
model functioning as the basis to the range or ranges of the 
real world similarly structured, or to their different mo-
dalities as alternative possible worlds. For determining the 
alternatives the procedures used in modal logic can serve as 
models. 
In finalizing, we are of the conviction that all ques-
tions dealt with must play a central role in every such se-
mantic theory that lays claim to the description and ex-
planation of literary texts. At the same time, we see clearly 
that we had to ignore several factors in this study without 
which the problems raised cannot be solved satisfactorily. 
We hope that our work, in this restricted sense, contrib-
utes to a research not yet finished. 
Notes 
+ This study is the revised version of our earlier work 
entitled "Mögliche Welten" unter literaturtheoretischem 
Aspekt. The original one was lectured on the II. Inter-
national Congress of Semiotics (Vienna) in 1979. 
1 Frege described his semantic theory in several studies, 
in a form modified several times. 
2 
For the discussion of these question see Poetics 1979, 
Vol. 8, No. 1/2. 
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3 Cf. Breltinger 1966 (1740). 
4 
At our statements we relied mainly on the works of 
Link 19 76 and Rescher 1975. 
5 Cf. Rescher 1975: p. 4. 
^ This concept is mainly represented by Rescher 1975. 
7 Rescher 1975: p, 92 and 193. 
8 Rescher 1975: p. 92. 
9 Rescher 1975: p, 84,' 
1 0 Hintikka 1975: p. 160. 
